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Abstract. The spatial distribution of households and firms, or urban spatial 
structure, is a core element of the study of urban economics and the crucial 
determinant of commuting patterns. This paper examines developments in the 
analysis of urban spatial structure and commuting that are related to the urban 
labour market - that is the analysis of labour supply and labour demand in a 
spatial context. These developments have been overlooked in the traditional 
approach to urban structure and commuting where most attention has been 
devoted to  the markets for land and housing rather than the market for labour. 
Yet a little reflection suggests that the labour market might have a great deal to 
d o  with the location decisions of households and firms, and hence with 
commuting patterns. We argue that much criticism of the economic analysis of 
urban structure and commuting can be addressed by explicit incorporation of the 
labour market into the conventional model of urban location. This criticism 
includes findings that the theory cannot explain the tendency for richer 
households to live farther from the central business district and commute farther 
to work (Wheaton, 1977) and findings of substantial unexplained or ‘wasteful’ 
commuting according t o  conventional theory (Hamilton, 1982). The paper 
begins by outlining the basic model of residential location and commuting 
(Section 2). We then consider extensions that involve the introduction of labour 
supply decisions and which determine the value of commuting time (Section 3). 
More recent extensions involve the introduction of decentralized workplaces 
(Section 4) and, logically, the issues of job  search and migration (Section 5 ) .  We 
conclude with a summary of the progress in incorporating labour market 
behaviour into the analysis of urban structure and commuting and our 
suggestions for further research in this area. 
Keywords: Commuting; urban structure; labour market; residential location; 
workplace location. 
1. Introduction 
The spatial distribution of households and firms, or urban spatial structure, is 
a core element of the study of urban economics. This spatial distribution in turn 
determines commuting patterns, which are important to urban transportation 
planning. This paper examines developments in the economic analysis of 
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commuting which will be of interest to both urban economists and urban 
transportation planners. 
The paper concentrates on developments in the analysis of urban spatial 
structure and commuting related to  the urban labour market, that is the analysis 
of labour supply and labour demand in a spatial context. These developments 
have been overlooked in the traditional approach to urban structure and 
commuting. Considerable attention has been given to the markets for land and 
housing in urban areas but very little to the market for labour (e.g. Mills, 1987). 
Yet a little reflection suggests that the labour market might have a great deal to 
do with the location decisions of households and firms, and hence with 
commuting patterns. We believe that this is an oversight that merits a separate 
survey paper. 
We argue that much criticism of the economic analysis of urban structure and 
commuting can be addressed by explicit incorporation of the labour market into 
the conventional model of urban location. This criticism includes Wheaton’s 
(1977) findings that the theory cannot explain the tendency for richer households 
to live farther from the central business district and commute farther to work 
and Hamilton’s (1982) finding of substantial unexplained or ‘wasteful’ 
commuting according to  conventional theory. 
The paper begins by outlining the basic model of residential location and 
commuting (Section 2). We then consider extensions that involve the 
introduction of labour supply decisions and which determine the value of 
commuting time (Section 3). More recent extensions involve the introduction of 
decentralized workplaces (Section 4) and, logically, the issue of workplace choice 
(Section 5 ) .  We conclude with a summary of the progress in incorporating labour 
market behaviour into the analysis of urban structure and commuting and our 
suggestions for further research in this area. 
2. The basic model 
The basic model of residential location and commuting is an extension of the 
standard problem of consumer choice involving two goods. Let q be the amount 
of housing (or land, assuming expenditures on land and housing are 
proportional) and let x be the amount of the Hicksian composite commodity, 
representing all other goods. The extension to  the standard consumer choice 
model is the specification of costs for housing and commuting which differ 
according to location. Let all economic activity occur in the centre of the city 
(the monocentric city assumption) and let h be the distance to the city centre. 
Then let the price gradient for housing be p ( h ) ,  which is exogenous to  the 
individual consumer, and the cost of commuting be c ( h ) .  These prices depend 
only on distance to  the city centre, h (the featureless plain assumption), where 
ac/ah > 0. We now have a fairly simple consumer problem: 
( 1 )  max U ( q ,  x )  subject to p(h)q + x + c ( h )  = y 
where y is consumer income and the price of goods bundle x is normalized. 
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The standard first order conditions' for a maximum are 
and 
Equation (3) is the equilibrium bid-rent schedule for the consumer, indicating 
that the household is willing to incur higher commuting costs per unit of land, 
aclahlq, provided that there is a compensating reduction in unit land costs, 
aplah. This trade-off between land and commuting costs is the fundamental 
insight of the basic model and early residential location literature. 
The model introduces a third decision variable - commuting distance, h ,  
which confers disutility on the consumer (or access to the city centre, - h ,  which 
confers utility). We can therefore write a solution to the consumer problem of 
q, x ,  and h in terms of the parameters of the problem. In particular, we can write 
h = h [ U ( . ) , p ( . ) , c ( * ) ;  Y l  (4) 
to represent the consumer's locational equilibrium decision. If U( * ) , p (  a )  and 
c ( .  ) are the same for everyone, then differences in location will depend solely 
upon income, y .  We can therefore obtain from the first order conditions (Siegel, 
1975; Simpson, 1977) 
( 5 )  - _  - 
where 
A =  
0 
a2u 
ax2 
-
0 
1 
au a p  
ax ah 
0 
P 
1 
ap ac q-+- 
ah ah 
0 
and where 17 = I  (a2U/aq2)q/aU/aq I is the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
land (Alonso, 1964). From equation (3, 
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implying that consumers with more income will prefer to trade off more 
commuting for cheaper land if the elasticity T,I is sufficiently small, a prediction 
which is in broad agreement with the pattern of settlement in American cities. 
The role of income in residential location theory has always been considered 
to be crucial and has been the subject of several extensions to the analysis. A 
simple but interesting extension to the model assumes that the cost of commuting 
depends upon income (Muth, 1969, for example) so that 
ac 
a Y  
c = c(h,  y ) ,  - > 0 
in consumer problem (1). Then the first order conditions do  not change, but we 
can examine the effect of income on the bid-rent schedule (3): 
Let M =  - ac/ah be the marginal travel cost for any consumer. Then (7) can be 
rewritten 
where v~~ = dM/M/ay/y and vqu = dq/q/ay/y are the income elasticities of 
marginal travel cost and land respectively. Higher income implies a flatter bid- 
rent schedule (since ap/ah c 0) and, in a competitive bidding process, more 
distant locations from the centre (Alonso, 1964). Thus ahlay > 0 and, in 
particular, 
which agrees with equation (6). 
How does income affect the cost of commuting? What Muth and others 
undoubtedly have in mind is a link between income and the value of commuting 
time as an important component of commuting cost. If we are to attach a value 
to commuting time, however, then commuting time should appear in the 
consumer’s utility function. Moreover, commuting time cannot simply be 
included in the composite good x in equation (1) for reasons that we articulate 
in the next section. 
One potential solution to this problem is provided by assuming that 
commuting distance h enters the utility function directly (Alonso, 1964; 
Wheaton, 1977): 
(10) max U(q,  x, h )  subject to p ( h ) q  + x + c(h, y )  = y 
The conditions implied by this problem are 
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and 
In this case bid-rent schedules are steeper because of the monetized value of the 
disutility of commuting, given by aU/ah/aU/ax, which could reflect the value of 
commuting time when time is an unspecified function of distance. The effect of 
income on the bid-rent schedule is 
where M = aU/ah/aU/ax - ac/ah is now the total marginal cost of travel and q~~ 
and qqv are defined as above. Thus the effect of income depends on the difference 
between the income elasticities of total marginal travel costs and land, q ~ ,  - qqv. 
This analysis addresses the value of commuting time only indirectly. There is 
no explicit relationship between commuting distance and commuting time. More 
importantly, however, there is no specified relationship among commuting time, 
working time and leisure time. Any satisfactory discussion of the value of 
commuting time requires an analysis of the allocation of time among alternative 
users. 
Empirical analysis called into question this basic theory of residential location 
as an explanation of location-income patterns in American cities. Muth (1969) 
found no relationship between distance from the city centre and household 
income in Chicago when age of the housing stock was included in his regression 
analysis. Later, Wheaton (1977) estimated the relationship between bid-rent 
schedules and income and found it to be too weak to explain the existing distinct 
location-income patterns of urban settlement in the United States. 
Traditional analysis of residential location has provided many other extensions 
to the theory which involve analysis of the markets for land and housing 
(Straszheim, 1987, and Brueckner, 1987, for example). We take a different 
direction, concentrating on the consumer as a participant in the urban labour 
market. We argue that this is a fruitful line of enquiry that is generally 
overlooked in urban economic analysis. We have already indicated, for example, 
that we believe that it makes little sense to  consider the value of commuting time, 
as analysts often do, without explicitly considering the allocation of time - a 
traditional topic in the economics of labour supply. 
3. The basic model and the allocation of time 
Hekman (1980) argues that the failure of the basic model to explain location- 
income patterns rests on one crucial phenomenon, household labour supply. 
Labour supply cannot be ignored, or buried in the composite good x,  because 
differences in income across households normally imply differences in earnings 
which in turn imply differences in the value of leisure. I f  the relative price of 
leisure to other goods changes, leisure cannot be included in the composite good 
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and must be considered separately to permit substitution of leisure for other 
goods. Similarly, commuting time cannot be included in the composite good x 
if its value varies with income across households. 
Consider a single worker in the household' and let his/her total time T be 
divided into work time L ,  Leisure time I ,  and commuting time t. Commuting 
time and cost depend upon location and time spent working, which is assumed 
to be proportional to the number of worktrips, so that t = t ( L ,  h ) ,  at/aL > 0 ,  
and c = c ( L ,  h ) ,  ac/aL > 0. The household receives earnings w per time period 
and unearned income y and maximizes a utility function which now includes 
leisure (Beckmann, 1974; Henderson, 1985): 
max W q ,  x,  0 
subject to p(h )q  + x + c( L ,  h )  = wL + y (14) 
and L ( h )  + I + t (  L ,  h )  = T 
The solution must satisfy the conditions that 
and 
(17) 
The equilibrium bid-rent schedule now depends upon direct commuting cost as 
in equation (3) but also upon commuting time, labour supply behaviour, and the 
wage rate. 
Hekman concentrates on variation in the labour supply of households by 
income and location. Consider again the effect of household income on the bid- 
rent schedule (17): 
ap - aqah + watiah + ac/aL a q a h  + wat/aL a q a h  
ah 4 
-- - 
M 
where the total marginal cost of travel is now M =  - (dc/ah + wat/ah). Wheaton 
(1977) finds that q~~ - qqy = 0, but flatter bid-rent schedules may still arise as 
income increases if 
Clearly qqy > 0 as before so the question is whether 
Since ac/aL > 0 and at/aL > 0, Hekman examines a/ay(aL/ah). He finds that, 
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as distance h and income y increase, labour supply falls dramatically for women 
and thus falls overall for the household. Thus expression (19) is negative - that 
is, greater distance and income are associated with reduced labour supply and 
lower total (direct and time) marginal costs of commuting. This result can 
account for flatter bid-rent curves, and residential locations farther from the 
centre, for higher income households. The crucial consideration ignored by 
Wheaton, and by the early versions of residential location theory, is labour 
supply behaviour. 
The analysis introduces a second shift parameter, labour supply, into the 
analysis of commuting distance. Its direct effect can be easily seen by writing 
c ( L ,  h )  = K(L)Ch 
and 
t ( L ,  h )  = K(L)Dh 
where K ( L )  is the number of commuting trips, which depends on labour 
supplied (aK/aL > 0), C is the money cost per mile of a trip, and D is the time 
spent per mile of a trip. From (21) we can rewrite the bid-rent schedule (17) as 
We can then examine the effect of labour supply on the bid-rent schedule. 
Assuming that the number of commuting trips is proportional to labour supply, 
so that a2K/dL2 = 0, 
Thus increased labour supply, meaning increased commuting, makes the 
(negatively sloped) bid-rent schedule of households steeper, other factors 
(income) held constant. Thus households with more labour supply, in particular 
households where there is a second earner (usually a married woman), will locate 
closer to the city centre to reduce commuting costs. 
Hekman demonstrates the importance of labour supply decisions in 
accounting for residential location behaviour, but his analysis of commuting 
time is incomplete. Since commuting time does not enter the utility function, the 
value of commuting time must equal the value of leisure because the two uses 
of time are combined (Wales, 1978; Madden and White, 1980).3 While this 
represents some improvement over the models in the previous section, its validity 
can only be tested by explicit inclusion of commuting time in the utility function 
to assess its relative value. 
As Kohlhase (1986) states, the attempt to endogenize all three uses of time 
greatly complicates the consumer problem. Thus she also argues for a model 
such as equation (14) which fixes commuting hours so that commuting time t can 
be handled exogenously. Yet this cannot be satisfactory for any analysis of 
commuting decisions and residential location. 
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The introduction of commuting time t into the utility function immediately 
raises the problem of attaching a price to it. In the majority of the literature this 
is an unsolved problem. To our knowledge there are two exceptions. One way 
to find a price for commuting time, formulated by Oi (1976), is to relate the 
marginal utility of leisure proportionally to the marginal utility of commuting 
time. The sign of the parameter which links both marginal utilities then depends 
on whether commuting is seen as a disutility or as a utility. As far as we know, 
however, this construction has never been applied in empirical research. 
Another solution to the problem of the value of commuting time has been 
formulated by Wales (1978). He includes commuting time directly in the utility 
function of the household: 
max U ( q ,  x ,  1, t )  
subject to  p ( t ) q  + x = W L  + y (24) 
and L + I +  t = T 
This specification combines equations (10) and (14) if we equate commuting 
time, t ,  and distance from the centre, h, in our monocentric The solution 
to the problem given by (24) must satisfy the conditions: 
and 
a p  aulat 
at aulax  
w + q - = - ~ V t  
where vt is Wales’ value of commuting time. Note that the value of commuting 
time includes both the wage rate, which is the marginal value of leisure from 
equation (16), and the reduction in housing expenditures arising from the 
additional time spent commuting. Since qaplat c 0 in general (equation (3)), we 
expect that vI < w, contrary to the implicit assumption that v, = w in other 
models where commuting time is excluded from the utility function. 
By specifying a particular functional form for p ( t ) ,  namely 
P ( t )  = PtY (28) 
then Wales obtains 
where only y is unobserved in equation (29) for suitable household microdata. 
Inserting equation (29) into a Generalized Cobb-Douglas demand system for 
q,  x ,  I ,  and t and using Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation yields 
an estimate of y of -0.1 and an estimate of uI for all households of $3.22 per 
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hour compared to an average wage rate of $4.72 per hour. Wales concludes that 
‘on the average commuting time is valued at about two-thirds of the wage rate’ 
(p. 222). 
Wales’ model is very elegant. I t  introduces commuting time t into the utility 
function and it presents an estimate for the value of t. One problem, however, 
is that commuting time is specified as a utility with a positive price. It seems more 
realistic to specify commuting time as a disutility with a negative price. 
Moreover, commuting time in this model is seen as a product of residential 
relocation, but it is clear that workplace choice also affects commuting time. This 
topic will be discussed in the next two sections. 
4. The basic model with decentralized employment 
Employment in cities is decentralizing and the proportion of employment in 
central cities is declining dramatically (Kain, 1968; Mills, 1972; Scott, 1982). In 
the absence of a model that explicitly permits employment decentralization, 
empirical studies to test residential location models or to estimate the value of 
commuting time typically adapt the monocentric theory of the previous sections. 
A more suitable approach would be to formulate a model of residential location 
decisions with decentralized employment that would be suitable for testing and 
other empirical analysis. 
The simplest adaptation of residential location models to incorporate 
decentralized employment is to assume some pre-determined work location for 
a given household. Then the residential location models of the previous sections 
can be used with one important addition. Commuting cost can simply be 
redefined in terms of distance (or time) to the work site rather than the city 
centre. I f  j is the distance of the job from the city centre and h is the distance 
of the home from the city centre, then we may write commuting cost as c ( h , j ) ,  
where &/ah > 0 and ac/dj c 0. The land price gradient must still refer to 
distance from the city centre, however, since the centre remains the most 
preferred site. We can then revise problem (l), or any of the subsequent 
extensions, to incorporate a non-central work site as follows: 
(30) max U ( q ,  x )  subject to p ( h ) q  + x + c(h,  j )  = y 
The solution to this problem satisfies the same conditions (2) and (3) as our initial 
problem, but job location j is now a parameter in the solution. In particular, we 
should write locational equilibrium condition (3) as 
In principle, this does not change the equilibrium conditions if, for example, 
d2c/dhdj = 0. In the strict model we have defined, utility-maximizing households 
would reside farther from the city centre than their place of work on a ray from 
the city centre to obtain the lowest possible combination of commuting and land 
costs. Thus commuting distance would be h - j and, if commuting costs were 
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proportional to distance, i3'claha.j = 0 so that condition (31) is equivalent to 
condition (3). 
The problem that arises is that all households prefer jobs located as far from 
the city centre as possible since these sites reduce total, if not marginal, 
commuting costs (aclaj < 0). In the budget constraint in equation (30), more 
distant work sites are equivalent to a higher income if households can choose 
work locations. Once the concept of decentralized employment is entertained, 
workplace choice becomes an important consideration. 
The standard treatment of workplace choice is t o  introduce the concept of an 
urban wage gradient (Moses, 1962; Muth, 1969). More distant work sites are not 
preferred because wage offers at more distant sites are bid down until excess 
demand for those sites is eliminated. Thus an earnings or income gradient, y (  j ) ,  
aylaj < 0, is introduced which leaves identical workers as well off at central a: 
at suburban work sites. 
A simple extension is to permit job location to be a decision variable and to 
derive a wage gradient as well as a land price gradient. Recent models of this type 
have adopted models similar to specification (14), incorporating leisure in the 
utility function but ignoring the effect of labour supply on commuting cost and 
earnings (Straszheim, 1984; White, 1988)6: 
max W d h ,  j ) ,  x (h ,  j ) ,  W ,  j ) l  
subject to  p(h)q(h ,  j )  + x(h ,  j )  + w(j ) l (h ,  j )  
= W I T +  Y - k ( h ,  j )  + W ) t ( h , j ) l  (32) 
This model generates the usual conditions equivalent to equations (15) and (16). 
Using those conditions, the location equilibrium conditions for the places of 
residence and work can be written as 
and 
(34) 
aw - aclaj + watlaj - aclaj + waT/aj 
aj  T - t - 1  L 
- - -
where L(h ,  j )  = T -  t - I is hours worked as in equation (14). 
Condition (33) appears to  be equivalent to equation (17) when labour supply 
is omitted such that aL/ah = 0. The one important difference is that the wage 
rate varies by job location as indicated by equation (34). Since aclaj < 0 and 
at/aj c 0,' awlaj c 0 in equation (34). Wage gradients have a negative slope like 
land price gradients. This means that otherwise identical households may have 
different rent offer curves because of differing job locations and that households 
with different job locations may segregate into different concentric residential 
rings (White, 1988, 143). 
From equations (33) and (34) we may find an expression for the relative rate 
of decline of the wage and land price gradients: 
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White specifies c(h,  j )  = 2m(h - j ) ,  where m is direct commuting cost per unit of 
distance, and t (h ,  j ) = 2 s ( h -  j ) ,  where s is commuting time cost per unit of 
distance. One-way commuting distance is always h - j .  Thus, 
- (aclaj + w arlaj) = 2m + ~ S W  = aclah + w atlah 
for White and the relative gradient decline is determined by the ratio of housing 
costs to earnings, p q / w L ,  or about 25 per cent. She concludes that wage offer 
curves will decline at about one-quarter of the rate that rent offer curves decline. 
The problem with the model represented by equation (32),  as with Hekman’s 
(1980) model earlier, is that commuting time is excluded from the utility 
function. Thus commuting time must be subsumed as leisure and assigned a 
value equivalent to the value of leisure, despite evidence to the contrary (Wales, 
1978, for example). Thus, the ultimate model for location choice in a consumer 
demand framework should modify equation (32) to include commuting time 
r(h, j )  in the utility function to  permit the value of commuting time to be 
determined as in equation (27).  
Models with decentralized employment provide new and interesting 
predictions, particularly when the assumption of homogeneous households is 
relaxed. White (1988, 151) argues that households with more income will 
continue to commute farther but that residential location will be segregated on 
the basis of workplace location. Thus the ring of households in a particular 
income group commuting to  a particular ring of workplace locations may be 
quite ‘thin.’ Households may only be indifferent to residential location within 
this narrow ring. If we introduce other dimensions of household heterogeneity, 
then these rings may be correspondingly thinner. In particular, White discusses 
the effect of differences in skill level. More skilled workers will have a higher 
wage and hence a higher value of commuting time from expression (32).’ This 
raises the skilled worker’s wage offer curve - they demand higher wage 
compensation for longer in-commuting. Thus firms have a stronger incentive to 
locate in the suburbs the larger is the skilled work force as a proportion of total 
costs. Wage offer curves, and therefore wage gradients, will be steeper for skilled 
workers, a testable proposition that we will reconsider in the next section. Other 
interesting dimensions of household heterogeneity would include the number of 
workers, based on the importance of second-earner labour supply in location 
decisions as discussed in section 3 (equation (23)).  
5. Workplace choice and commuting 
The models in the previous section illustrate that, once decentralized 
employment is admitted, workplace choice must be introduced. In this section 
we evaluate the research on this issue to date and consider new avenues for 
research which focus on the urban labour market. In particular, we argue that 
the analysis to  date is deficient in important respects and can be improved by 
turning to the vast literature on job search and workplace choice in labour 
 economic^.^ Since residential location theory is generally static, we focus on a 
56 SIMPSON AND VAN DER VEEN 
static approach to workplace location, although there are natural extensions to 
a dynamic model of residential and workplace location decisions. 
Some static models of workplace location have relied on a simplified version 
of model (32) in which residential location, h, is fixed and only job location, j ,  
is to be determined. Locational equilibrium is then given by condition (34) in 
which the reservation wage of workers rises with commuting costs. That is, 
dc/aj < 0 and di /d j  < 0 implies a w / d j  < 0 in equation (34). Leonard (1987) 
expresses commuting costs for blacks in terms of distance from a monocentric 
black residential population, the ghetto. Then the farther that a firm is located 
from the ghetto, the less likely it is to employ blacks because black wage offers 
rise with distance from the ghetto. McCormick (1986) adds search costs but 
assumes only two employment locations. He derives the wage offer gradient as 
the ratio of wages at the two locations. In his model blacks commute longer 
distances because their moving costs are higher and because whites are more 
likely to receive preferred nearby jobs. Other research has implicitly adopted this 
approach of fixing residential location when analyzing the commuting behaviour 
of married women (Kain, 1962; Rees and Shultz, 1970; Beesley and Dalvi, 1974; 
Evers and van der Veen, 1986). l o  
This approach is unsatisfactory because residential location decisions are 
ignored. In addition, we argue that models based solely on the framework of 
residential location theory outlined in previous sections cannot provide an 
adequate basis to deal with both workplace and residential location. Consider the 
location equilibrium for residence and workplace generated from equations (33) 
and (34) in the previous section: 
h* = h [4( * 1 9 4  * ) 9  P ( '  ), w( * ), d' 1, t (  - 1; Y , j * l  (36) 
(37) j *  = j[4('), I ( * ) ,  P(*), N - 1 ,  C(' 1 1  t ( * ) ;  Y ,  h*l 
These equations, derived from the consumer problem (32), are not identified in 
econometric terms because the equations contain the same set of independent 
variables. Models that focus only on the household do not generate distinct 
models of residential and workplace choice behaviour. In this sense the theory 
of workplace location is incomplete. To complete it requires the introduction of 
a model of the labour market in urban space. Consumer problem (32) provides 
an analysis of the wage offers of households (equation (34)) at any workplace 
location but ignores the wage offers made by firms. Yet the wage offers of firms 
may vary considerably across a city depending upon the size of the employment 
centre and local employment demand. It is these wage offers by firms coupled 
with the wage offers of households, more appropriately termed the reservation 
wages of households, " that determine job choice and workplace location. 
The wage offers of firms depend upon their labour requirements and those of 
their competitors. If there are many firms, or a few large firms seeking many 
workers, then wage offers will rise until vacancies are filled adequately. In 
particular, higher wage offers will expand the catchment area by compensating 
for commuting by more distant workers. Thus the central business district will 
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normally have a larger catchment area, generated by higher wage offers, than 
smaller suburban employment centres. A wage gradient arises because 
employment density is greater relative to population density nearer the city 
centre, generating greater demand for labour and higher wage offers near to the 
city centre to attract more distant workers. 
The simplest case in which to consider these concepts involves only two 
employment centres, a business district in the city centre and a suburban 
employment centre. Consider any individual located a distance h from the city 
centre and a distance I from the suburban (or local) employment centre. The 
simplest case, dictated by residential location equilibrium, is to assume that the 
suburban employment centre is on a line between the residential location and the 
city centre. Thus, I < h.  Now divide the city into two districts or 'islands' 
consisting of L, workers living in the district that includes the city centre and Ll 
workers living in the district that includes the suburban employment centre. Let 
there be N, jobs in the city centre and NI jobs at the suburban centre, where 
N, > Ni. Labour market equilibrium requires 
N, + Ni = L, + Li (38) 
We can now introduce the labour supply behaviour of workers implied by 
equation (34). Workers prefer less commuting and must be compensated to 
undertake more commuting. Let f ( w , r )  be the probability that a worker will 
accept a job involving commuting distance r and offering wage w. Equation (34) 
implies that af ldw > 0 and dddr c 0. Equilibrium in the suburban employment 
centre requires that the worker be offered a wage WI such that 
f ( W i ,  I )  = N//Li s (39) 
where s is jobs per resident worker in the suburban district. Since most of the 
jobs are in the centre, s < 1 and all suburban employment requirements are filled 
by suburban residents. Some suburban residents must be lured to the city centre, 
however, by firms which pay a wage w, to  attract them. Therefore, equilibrium 
also requires 
so that the remainder of the suburban workers are attracted to the central city. 
Then the expected commuting distance of the worker at distance h from the 
centre and I from the suburban employment centre is 
(41) 
such that &/as = I - h < 0. If there are more jobs per resident worker in the 
suburban district, fewer suburban residents must leave their district to  work and 
commuting declines. 
Given h and I, commuting distance varies with s, the ratio of local jobs to local 
residents who work. Thus, by rearranging equation (41), job location will depend 
r = h - j = f ( W 1 ,  I). I +  f(wc, h ) - h  = S'  I + (1  - S ) '  h 
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upon local employment opportunities 
j = h - [h  - s - ( h  - I ) ]  = s - ( h  - I )  (42) 
such that a j / d s  = h - I > 0 and aj/ah = s c 1. This provides us with a basic 
model of workplace choice that incorporates equation (34) and replaces equation 
(37) derived solely from residential and labour supply behaviour . 
Because equations (39) and (40) capture the wage offer gradient in equation 
(34), they can be used to derive a wage gradient for the two islands in this model. 
In particular, h > I mens that Wc- > WI to compensate for more commuting to the 
city centre. The difference from earlier models is that the wage gradient now 
depends explicitly on the spatial distribution of jobs and workers between the 
two districts, captured by the variable s. Thus a city with a smaller suburban 
employment centre in relative terms (smaller s) will have a steeper wage gradient 
because central city firms will have to pay a larger premium to attract a larger 
proportion of suburban residents to central city jobs (as s decreases, WI falls in 
equation (39) and Wc rises in equation (40)). This is a feature of wage gradients 
that is likely to stand up to empirical scrutiny but that cannot be captured by 
models, such as those in section 4, which ignore urban labour demand and 
labour market equilibrium. 
This simple model is extended by Simpson (1980). His model considers the city 
as a series of ‘islands’ or employment centres available to  any worker.’’ He 
shows that the catchment area for firmsL3 grows as local employment demand 
relative to  local workers (s) increases and as local wage offers (w) decline. Using 
a model of firms as dynamic monsponists, Simpson shows that wage rates rise 
as s rises because of the competition for local workers. Since higher wage rates 
increase the probability of local workers accepting local jobs, expected 
commuting distance declines and expected work location j rises as s increases, 
just as in our simple model above. 
Simpson (1980) also extends this model by considering the effect of skill level 
on job search behaviour. He argues that skill acquisition broadens the spatial 
extent of job search because it is partly non-enterprise-specific and restricts job 
choice. Skill acquisition therefore leads to  more extensive formal search methods 
by both workers and employers. Thus, although the value of commuting time 
rises with wages and skill level (section 3), Simpson argues that skilled workers 
will be less responsive to local employment conditions than unskilled workers, 
contrary to  predictions based only on the value of commuting time from models 
in previous sections. Evidence for Greater London (Simpson, 1980) and Toronto 
(Simpson, 1987 and 1989) from a simultaneous model of residential and 
workplace location estimated on cross-sectional household microdata supports 
this argument. In fact, Simpson’s evidence for Toronto finds that his workplace 
choice equation is more important to the explanation of commuting behaviour 
than a standard residential location equation, l4  particularly for recent job 
movers, second earners, and homeowners as would be expected. 
Additional tests of this approach are possible. One straightforward test would 
be to estimate wage gradients for workers by skill level. The basic model with 
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decentralized employment in section 4 predicts, based on the value of commuting 
time, that more skilled workers will have steeper wage gradients (e.g., White, 
1988, 149). Simpson’s (1980) model, concentrating on job search in the urban 
labour market, predicts exactly the opposite - that more skilled workers will 
have flatter wage gradients. These nested hypotheses await direct testing with 
spatially disaggregated labour market activity microdata. 
Evidence that workplace choice behaviour is an important aspect of 
commuting decisions can answer Hamilton’s (1982) criticism that traditional 
residential location models leave a great deal of unexplained, or ‘wasteful,’ 
commuting in American and Japanese cities, Hamilton finds that commuters in 
the United States travel about eight times as far as necessary and commuters in 
Japan travel about three as far as necessary, based on minimum average 
commuting requirements estimated from population and employment density 
gradients. He argues that much of this wasteful commuting may arise because 
‘people may have found it in their interest to  change jobs ... and found new jobs 
which do not conform to the optimization rules’ (p. 1046). In other words, what 
is required is a theory of workplace location to supplement the conventional 
theory of residential location. He estimates that a workplace location theory may 
be able to explain commuting distances much better than residential location 
theory, a result which agrees with Simpson’s (1987) analysis for Toronto. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Our paper has considered extensions to residential location theory and the 
analysis of urban commuting behaviour from what appears to be a unique 
perspective in urban economics - the perspective of the urban labour market. 
The paper argues that this perspective offers some important insights into the 
analysis of commuting behaviour and allows us to explain many empirical 
puzzles in the literature on the economics of commuting. In particular, we have 
argued that analysis of commuting behaviour should not ignore the allocation of 
time between work, commuting and leisure and it should not ignore workplace 
choice arising from the spatial variation in the demand for labour across urban 
areas. We believe that labour economics provides fertile ground to  extend our 
understanding of the economics of commuting and urban spatial structure. Since 
meaningful integration of labour economics and urban spatial theory has not 
been vigorously pursued, much research remains to be done. Under the usual 
economic assumptions of diminishing returns, we expect that the benefits to 
research in this area remain very high at this early stage. 
Notes 
1. The second order conditions for a maximum are ensured by appropriate restrictions 
2. The assumption of a single worker simplifies Hekman’s analysis, which concentrates 
on the utility function. 
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on the labour supply behaviour of women and, in particular, the labour supply of 
married women as second earners in households. His analysis effectively ignores male 
labour supply behaviour. Other studies which consider male and female labour supply 
separately include Oi (1976) and Kohlhase (1986). 
3. We have already seen that leisure time and commuting time cannot be combined in 
the composite good x .  
4. For simplicity, we ignore taxes in our model. 
5 .  Wales uses the 1972 Panel Study of Income Dynamics from the University of 
Michigan, 
6. We specify land rent gradient p ( h )  such that ap/aj = 0 and wage gradient w ( j )  such 
that awlah = 0. For justification of this specification see White (1988, 138). 
7. These conditions are satisfied by households in this model because they will locate on 
a ray from the origin through their job location, but farther out than their job 
location, to minimize the costs of land and commuting. 
8. See also the discussion of the value of commuting time in section 3 which motivates 
the expression of commuting costs in terms of the wage rate as in equation (32). In 
single worker households where all income is earned, households with higher incomes 
have more skilled workers. This situation reduces the incentives for them to locate 
farther from the city centre as discussed in section 2. 
9. Most of this literature ignores the intrinsic spatial character of job search so that 
adaptation of the literature is not direct. 
10. The literature on commuting and discrimination by race and sex is too extensive to  
consider in this survey. For an expanded discussion, see Simpson (1992, chapter 5). 
1 1 .  That is, the wage required by a household to  accept a job at  location j .  As j increases, 
the reservation wage declines because of the locational advantage in terms of 
commuting and land costs. Households search until they find a wage offer at a 
particular location that exceeds their reservation wage at that location. 
12. The ‘islands economy’ is used by Phelps (1970) and Lucas and Prescott (1974) to 
analyze the macroeconomic implications of job search. In their models, however, all 
workers on any island at  any time find employment on that island. If they wish to  
work on  another island next period, they must migrate to  that island for the next 
period. In Simpson’s model workers may find employment permanently on other 
islands and commute daily to  those jobs. Thus the islands of Phelps and Lucas and 
Prescott are regional labour markets in the usual sense while Simpson’s islands are 
intraurban local labour markets. 
13. that is, the area over which firms must recruit their work force, given the competition 
from other firms. 
14. The residential location equation is a standard one in the sense of the analysis 
surveyed in sections 2 and 4. The model is taken from Siege1 (1975). who also finds 
a stronger relationship for workplace location than residential location in explaining 
urban structure in the San Francisco Bay area. His analysis of workplace choice is, 
however, perfunctory. 
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